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Regulatory Developments in Risk
Management: Restoring Confidence
in Internal Models
Uwe Gaumert and Michael Kemmer
Abstract The paper deals with the question of how to restore lost confidence in
the results of internal models (especially market risk models). This is an impor-
tant prerequisite for continuing to use these models as a basis for calculating risk-
sensitive prudential capital requirements. The authors argue that restoring confidence
is feasible. Contributions to this end will be made both by the reform of regulatory
requirements under Basel 2.5 and the Trading Book Review and by refinements of
these models by the banks themselves. By contrast, capital requirements calculated
on the basis of a leverage ratio and prudential standardised approaches will not be
sufficient, even from a regulatory perspective, owing to their substantial weaknesses.
Specific proposals include standardising models with a view to reducing complexity
and enhancing comparability, significantly improving model validation and increas-
ing transparency as to how model results are determined, also over time. The article
reflects the personal views of the authors.
1 Introduction
Since 1997 (“Basel 1.5”), banks in Germany have been allowed to calculate their
capital requirements for the trading book using internal value-at-risk (VaR) models
that have passed a comprehensive and stringent supervisory vetting and approval
process. Basel II and Basel III saw the introduction of further internal models com-
plementing the standardised approaches already available—take, for example, the
internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk under Basel II and the advanced
credit valuation adjustment (CVA) approach for counterparty risk under Basel III.
During the financial crisis, particular criticism was directed at internal market risk
models, the design of which supervisors largely left to the banks themselves. This
article therefore confines itself to examining these models, which are a good starting
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point for explaining and commenting on the current debate. Much of the following
applies to other types of internal models as well.
Banks and supervisors learned many lessons from the sometimes unsatisfactory
performance of VaR models in the crisis—one of the root causes of the loss of confi-
dence by investors in model results. This led, at bank level, to a range of improvements
in methodology, and also to the realisation that not all products and portfolios lend
themselves to internal modelling. At supervisory level, Basel 2.5 ushered in an initial
reform with rules that were much better at capturing extreme risks (tail risks) and
that increased capital requirements at least threefold. Work on a fundamental trading
book review (Basel 3.5), which will bring further methodological improvements to
regulatory requirements, is also underway.
Nevertheless, models are still criticised as being
• too error-prone,
• suitable only for use in “fair-weather” conditions,
• too variable in their results when analysing identical risks,
• insufficiently transparent for investors and
• manipulated by banks, with the tacit acceptance of supervisors, with the aim of
reducing their capital requirements.
As a result, the credibility of model results and thus their suitability for use as a
basis for calculating capital requirements have been challenged. This culminated
in, for example, the following statement by the academic advisory board at the
German Ministry for Economic Affairs: “Behind these flaws (in risk modelling)1
lie fundamental problems that call into question the system of model-based capital
regulation as a whole.”2 It therefore makes good sense to explore the suitability of
possible alternatives. The authors nevertheless conclude that model-based capital
charges should be retained. But extensive efforts are needed to restore confidence in
model results.
2 Loss of Confidence in Internal Models—How Did It
Happen?
2.1 An Example from the First Years of the Crisis
The market disruption which accompanied the start of the financial crisis in the second
half of 2007 took the form in banks’ trading units of sharply falling prices with a
corresponding impact on their daily P&Ls after a prolonged phase of low volatility.
Uncertainty grew rapidly about the accuracy of estimated probabilities of default,
default correlations of the underlying loans and the scale of loss in the event of default,
1 Wording in brackets inserted by the authors.
2 [31], p. 19.
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and thus also about the probabilities of default and recovery rates of the securitisation
instruments. This in turn caused spreads to widen, volatility to increase and market
liquidity for securitisation products to dry up. A major exacerbating factor was that
many market participants responded in the same way (“flight to simplicity”, “flight
to quality”). Later on, there were also jump events such as downgrades. Calibrating
the above parameters proved especially problematic since there was often a lack of
historical default or market data. Unlike in the period before the crisis, even AAA-
rated senior or super senior tranches of securitisation instruments, which only start
to absorb loss much later than their riskier counterparts, suffered considerably in
value as the protective cushion of more junior tranches melted away, necessitating
substantial write-downs.3
The performance of internal market-risk models was not always satisfactory, espe-
cially in the second half of 2007 and in the “Lehman year” of 2008. In this period,
a number of banks found that the daily loss limits forecast by their models were
sometimes significantly exceeded (backtesting outliers).4 The performance results
of Deutsche Bank, for instance, show that losses on some sub-portfolios were evi-
dently serious enough to have an impact on the overall performance of the bank’s
trading unit. This demonstrates the extremely strong market disruption which can
follow an external shock. When backtesting a model’s performance, the current
clean P&L—P&Lt —is compared with the previous day’s VaR forecast VaRt−1.5 At
a confidence level of 99 %, an average of two to three outliers a year may be antic-
ipated over the long term (representing 1 % of 250–260 trading days a year). In the
years between 2007 and 2013, Deutsche Bank had 12, 35, 1, 2, 3, 2 and 2 outliers.6
Although the models’ performance for 2007 and 2008 looks bad at first sight, the
question nevertheless arises as to whether or not these outliers are really the models’
“fault”, so to speak. By their very nature, models can only do what they have been
designed to do: “If you’re in trouble, don’t blame your model.” To function properly,
the models needed liquid markets, adequate historical market data and total coverage
of all market risks, particularly migration and default risk. These prerequisites were
not always met by markets and banks. Anyone using a model has to be aware of its
limitations and exercise caution when working with its results.
Even Germany’s Federal Financial Supervisory Authority BaFin pointed out that,
given the extreme combination of circumstances on the market in connection with
the financial crisis, the figures do not automatically lead to the conclusion that the
predicative quality of the models is inadequate.7 The example could indicate that,
3 Cf. [18], p. 128.
4 [10], p. 8.
5 Between 2007 and 2009, only so-called “dirty” P&L results were published in chart form, while
outliers are based on “clean” P&L data. This inconsistency was eliminated in 2010. Dirty and clean
P&L figures may differ. This is because clean P&L simply shows end-of-day positions revalued
using prices at the end of the following trading day, whereas dirty P&L also includes income from
intraday trading, fees and commissions and interest accrued.
6 [11], Management Report, 2007, p. 88, 2008, p. 98, 2009, p. 85, 2010, p. 95, 2011, p. 104, 2012,
p. 167, 2013, p. 170.
7 [16], p. 133.
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since 2009, the bank has been successful in eliminating its models weaknesses, at
least at the highest portfolio level. It should nevertheless be borne in mind that market
phases analysed after 2008 were sometimes quieter and that there has also been some
reduction in risk. The increasing shift in the nature of the financial crisis from 2010
towards a crisis concerning the creditworthiness of peripheral European countries,
which created new market disruption, is most certainly reflected at the highest level of
the backtesting time series. Particularly large losses were incurred in March and May
2010, which only in May 2010 led to the two outliers realised that year. These outliers
may be explained by the fears brewing at the time about the situation of the PIIGS
states. Possibly, the scale of the corresponding trading activities was such that any
problems with the models for these sub-portfolios made themselves felt at the highest
portfolio level. The weaknesses outlined below were, by the banks own testimony,
identified and rapidly addressed.8 As mentioned above, two to three outliers per year
represent the number to be expected and are not sufficient, in themselves, to call the
quality of modelling into question.
The flaws banks identified in their models following the outbreak of the crisis
revealed that a variety of areas needed work and improvement. These improvements
have since been carried out. Some examples of model weaknesses which banks have
now resolved are9:
1. No coverage of default-risk driven “jump events”, such as rating changes and
issuer defaults. At the outbreak of the crisis, models often failed to cover the
growing amount of default risk in the trading book. The introduction of IRC
models10 to cover migration and default risk helped to overcome this.
2. Insufficient coverage of market liquidity risk. It was often not possible to liquidate
or hedge positions within the ten-day holding period assumed under Basel 1.5.
This led to risks being underestimated. Basel 2.5 takes account of market liquidity
risk explicitly and in a differentiated way, at least for IRC models. Full coverage
will be achieved under Basel 3.5.
3. Slow response to external shocks (outlier clustering). The introduction of stress
VaR under Basel 2.5 went a long way towards eliminating the problem of under-
estimating risks in benign market conditions. Historical market data for “normal
VaR” are now adjusted daily, while monthly or quarterly adjustments were the
norm before the crisis.
4. Insufficient consideration of the risk factors involved in securitisation. As a result,
models designed for securitisation portfolios may no longer be used to calculate
capital charges (with the exception of the correlation trading portfolio). Even
before the rule change, some banks had already decided themselves to stop using
these models.
5. Flawed proxy approaches. Prior to the crisis, it was often possible to assign a
newly introduced product to an existing one and assume the market risk would
8 Cf. [11], Management Report, 2010, p. 91.
9 [30], pp. 13–17.
10 IRC stands for incremental risk charge. This refers to risks such as migration and default risk,
which were not covered by traditional market risk models before the crisis.
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behave in the same way. During the crisis, this assumption proved to be flawed.11
The supervisory treatment of such approaches is now much more restrictive.
6. The approximation of changes in the price of financial instruments cannot accom-
modate large price movements (delta-gamma approximations). Full revaluation
of instruments is now standard practice.
7. No and/or flawed scaling to longer time horizons. Scaling practices of this kind,
such as square-root-of-time scaling, are now subject to prudential requirements
to ensure their suitability.
These problems were the basis of the review of market risk rules under Basel 2.5
and, as described above, were able to be eliminated both by banks themselves and by
new supervisory requirements.12 Despite this large-scale and appropriate response,
distrust of internal model results and their use for prudential purposes persisted,
leading to further fundamental discussions.13
2.2 Divergence of Model Results
This continuing distrust at the most senior level of the Basel Committee14 led to the
commissioning of the Standards Implementation Group for Market Risk (SIG-TB) to
compare the results generated by the internal models of various banks when applied
to the same hypothetical trading portfolios (hypothetical portfolio exercise). A major
point of criticism has always been that internal model results are too variable even if
the risks involved are the same. In January 2013, the SIG-TB published its analysis.15
The following factors were identified as the key drivers of variation:
• The legal framework: some of the banks in the sample did not have to apply Basel
2.5. This means the US banks, for instance, supplied data from models that had
neither been implemented nor approved. Analysis showed that some of these banks
had significantly overestimated risk, though this did not, in practice, translate into
higher capital requirements.
• National supervisory rules for calculating capital requirements: differences were
noted, for example, in the multipliers set by supervisors for converting model
results into capital requirements. In addition, some supervisors had already
imposed restrictions on the type of model that could be used and/or set specific
capital add-ons.
• Legitimate modelling decisions taken by the banks: among the most important
of these was the choice of model (spread-based, transition matrix-based) in the
absence of a market standard for modelling rating migration and default risk (IRC
11 [18], p. 133.
12 [21], pp. 59 ff., [25], p. 39.
13 Cf. Sect. 3.
14 The precise reasons for this distrust at senior level are not known.
15 Cf. [6].
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models). Different assumptions about default correlations also led to different
results. In VaR and stressed VaR models, major factors were the length of data
histories (at least one year, no maximum limit), the weighting system, the aggre-
gation of asset classes and of general and specific market risk, and the decision
whether to scale a one-day VaR up to ten days or estimate a 10-day VaR directly.
The choice of stress period for the stressed VaR also played an important role.16
In summary, the differences noted were the result of legitimate decisions taken
by banks with the approval of supervisors and of variations between supervisory
approval procedures. There is no evidence to suggest manipulation with the aim of
reducing capital requirements. Differences can also be explained by variations in
the applicable legal framework and in the market phase on which the study was
based. An issue related to the market phase is the length of the observation period
used. Observation periods of differing lengths will have an impact if, for instance,
the volatility of market data has changed from high (during a period over one year
ago) to low (last year). In this example, a bank using a one-year data history will not
capture the phase of higher volatility. This volatility will, by contrast, most certainly
be captured by any bank using a longer data history (with the extent also depending
on the weighting system applied to historical data).
It is also important to note that the study was based on a hypothetical portfolio
approach at the lowest portfolio level and not on real portfolios. The study does not
address the inherent weakness of this method. One major weakness is that the test
portfolios used do not reflect portfolio structures in the real world. Portfolios for
which banks calculate VaR are normally located at a far higher level in the portfolio
“tree” and are consequently more diversified. If the portfolios analysed had been
more realistic, variations would probably have been significantly less marked.17
Even if the variation between results can be readily explained and cannot be
“blamed” on the banks, it is nevertheless difficult to communicate differences of, for
instance, around 13–29 million euros in the results for portfolio 25, the most highly
aggregated portfolio.18 Efforts are most certainly needed to reduce the amount of
variation by means of further standardisation, even if complete alignment would not
make good sense (see Sect. 4.2). At first sight, the differences could also be interpreted
as a quantitative measure of the uncertainty surrounding model results and thus as an
expression of model risk. Section 4.7 will explore to what extent this is a reasonable
analysis and whether banks should try to capitalise model risk themselves as things
stand. As the next section shows, dispensing with internal models for prudential
purposes would not, by contrast, be the correct response.
16 Cf. [6], p. 10.
17 The study by the SIG has now been expanded to cover more complex portfolios, cf. [7]. The
results are nevertheless comparable. Variation increases with the complexity of the portfolios. In the
first analysis, this was found to be particularly the case with IRC modelling compared to “normal”
market risk modelling.
18 Cf. portfolio 25, [6], p. 27.
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3 Alternatives to Internal Models
3.1 Overview
Given the difficulties associated with modelling and the variation in results, it is
legitimate to ask whether model-based, risk-sensitive capital charges should be
dropped altogether. Such a step would, moreover, significantly simplify regulation.
But it could also be asked whether it would not make more sense to address the
undoubted weaknesses of internal models by means of the reforms already in place
or in the pipeline without “throwing the baby out with the bath water”, i.e. should we
not try to learn from past mistakes instead of just giving up. These questions can best
be answered systematically by examining to what extent the existing regulatory pro-
posals could, together or on their own, replace model-based capital charges. There
are essentially two alternatives under discussion:
• dropping risk-sensitive capital charges and introducing a leverage ratio as the sole
“risk metric”;
• regulatory standardised approaches: applying risk-sensitive capital charges while
abandoning model-based ones.
3.2 The Leverage Ratio
An exclusively applicable, binding leverage ratio—defined as the ratio of tier 1
capital to total assets including off-balance-sheet and derivative positions19—is only
a logical response if it must be assumed that neither banks nor supervisors are capa-
ble of measuring the risks involved in banking. Advocates of this approach talk of
the “illusion of the measurability of risk.”20 They argue that we are in a situation
of “uncertainty”, not “risk”. Uncertainty in decision theory is characterised by two
things: neither are all conceivable results known, nor is it possible to assign proba-
bilities to the results or estimate a probability density function. In this case, it would
not, for example, be possible to calculate a VaR defined as a quantile of a portfolio
loss distribution. This is only possible under “risk”.
The concepts of “uncertainty” and “risk” are, however, abstract, theoretical
extremes, while the various situations observed in reality usually lie somewhere
in between. The answer to the question of whether it is more appropriate to assume
a risk situation or an uncertainty situation is determined above all by the availability
of the data needed for the model estimate (such as market data or historical default
data). If, in addition, the risk factors associated with the financial instruments are
known and taken into account, and if the potential changes in the value of a trading
19 The most recent revision of the Basel Committee’s definition of the leverage ratio can be found
in draft form in [4] and, in its final form, in [8].
20 Cf. [31], p. 19.
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portfolio can be satisfactorily measured, (quality of the stochastic model, no normal
loss distribution as a rule), determining a VaR of portfolio losses is likely to be appro-
priate.21 This may be assumed for the vast majority of trading portfolios. Should this
nevertheless not be the case, regulatory standardised approaches, which normally
require less data to be available, could then be used. Reviewing and adjusting mod-
els is a never-ending task for banks. The model risks which undoubtedly exist (e.g.
estimation errors) are also a focus of supervisors’ attention. An awareness of the
limits of a model and of such model risks does not, however, make the use of models
obsolete.22 Although modelling by its very nature always involve simplification of
reality, quantitative and qualitative model validation is crucial. Supervisors set and
enforce stringent rules for such validation.23
Advocates of the “uncertainty approach” propose a so-called heuristic as a “rule
of thumb” and as a risk metric, at least for supervisors. Leverage ratios with widely
differing minimum levels have been suggested as a heuristic for ensuring the solvency
of banks. The levels called for range from 3 to 30 %.24 As is generally recognised, it
is not possible to infer a specific minimum level from theory.
The question of whether a leverage ratio is actually a suitable heuristic for ensur-
ing solvency has not been satisfactorily answered, however. Empirical studies to
determine to what extent the leverage ratio is a statistical, univariate risk factor that
can distinguish between banks that survive and those that fail come to different
conclusions.25 Often, no such distinguishing ability can be demonstrated. This may
have an economic explanation since the leverage ratio, as a vertical metric on the
liabilities side of the balance sheet, cannot act as a horizontal metric of a bank’s risk-
bearing capacity by means of which sources of loss (causes of insolvency), which
are mainly to be found on the assets side of the bank’s balance sheet, are compared
with a loss-absorbing indicator (capital). This can, by contrast, be accomplished by
ratios such as the “core tier 1” or “tier 1” capital ratio. If, moreover, a leverage ratio
were a measure capable of predicting the insolvency of certain types of banks, it
would probably swiftly cease to be a good measure once it became a binding target
(Goodhart’s Law).
What is more, the leverage ratio has a very long—and already widely discussed—
list of drawbacks.26 These are the points of most relevance here:
• Perverse incentives and the potential for arbitrage: there are strong incentives to
make business models more risky. Because assets are measured on a non-risk-
weighted basis, an AAA investment, for instance, ties up just as much capital as
does a B investment.
21 Cf. [19], p. 36.
22 See footnote 21
23 See also Sect. 4.6.
24 Cf., for example, [31], p. 23 (15 % capital ratio), cf. [26], p. 182 (20–30 % capital ratio). Leverage
ratios set at this level would override risk-based standards, thus rendering them obsolete.
25 Cf., for example, the summarising article [32], pp. 26 f.
26 Cf., for example, [17] or [20], p. 58.
Regulatory Developments in Risk Management … 27
• A leverage ratio is by no means “model free”: highly complex valuation models
or even simulation approaches are sometimes needed to measure derivatives on
a marked-to-market basis, for example. In a broader context, this is more or less
true for all balance-sheet valuations. So even a leverage ratio cannot claim to be
the simple, robust rule that proponents of a heuristic approach are looking for.27
• It makes it impossible to compare capital adequacy across banks. The adequacy
of a bank’s capital resources cannot be assessed without measuring the associated
risks.
For these and other reasons not mentioned here, the international banking community
continues to reject the leverage ratio as a sole indicator and as a binding limit. At most,
it may make sense to monitor changes in a bank’s leverage ratio, but not its absolute
level; this is the approach of the German Banking Act at present.28 Supervisors
have widely differing views on the leverage ratio. Even Haldane/Madouros (Bank
of England) by no means call in their famous “The dog and the frisbee” speech for
a leverage ratio on its own or a minimum leverage ratio set at such a high level that
risk-based requirements are overridden and therefore indirectly rendered obsolete
(leverage ratio as a frontstop instead of the Basel backstop). Owing to the massive
perverse incentives which they too have noted, they talk instead of placing leverage
ratios on an equal footing with capital ratios.29
3.3 Regulatory Standardised Approaches
Standardised approaches, i.e. approaches which spell out in detail how to calculate
capital requirements on the basis of prudential algorithms (“supervisory models”),
will always be needed for smaller banks which cannot or do not wish to opt for internal
models. But larger banks need standardised approaches too—as a fallback solution
if their internal models are or become unsuitable for all or for certain portfolios.
Having said that, a standardised approach alone is by no means sufficient for larger
banks; the reasons are as follows30:
• It is invariably true of a standardised approach that “one size does not fit all banks”.
Since a standardised approach is not tailored to an individual bank’s portfolio
structure, it cannot measure certain risks (such as certain basis risks) or can only
27 The discussion about a suitable definition of the leverage ratio also shows that improved definitions
invariably lead to significantly greater complexity, cf. [8].
28 Cf. Section 24 (1) (16) and (1a) (5) of the German Banking Act [27].
29 Cf. [24], p. 19: “The case against leverage ratios is that they may encourage banks to increase
their risk per unit of assets, reducing their usefulness as an indicator of bank failure—a classic
Goodhart’s Law. Indeed, that was precisely the rationale for seeking risk-sensitivity in the Basel
framework in the first place. A formulation which would avoid this regulatory arbitrage, while
preserving robustness, would be to place leverage and capital ratios on a more equal footing.” A
leverage ratio of at least 7 % would be necessary for this purpose, in the authors’ view.
30 Cf. [19], p. 37.
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do so very inaccurately. It is normally much less risk-sensitive than an internal
model.
• A related problem is that a standardised approach usually works only with com-
paratively simple portfolios. This results in risk being overstated or understated.
• It normally fails to capture diversification or hedging effects satisfactorily.
• Standardised approaches can thus be more dangerous than internal models because
it is often easy to “game the system”. Trading revenue, for instance, can be gen-
erated seemingly without risk, enabling trading units to inflate risk-adjusted earn-
ings.31
• If internal models are no longer used, supervisors will also have to dispense with
banks’ risk-management expertise.
• Standardised approaches are simple models. But as all proposals for standardised
approaches to date have shown, supervisors are by no means better at constructing
models than are the banks themselves.
A further alternative would be scenario-based approaches, which are often relatively
similar to models, such as those which may currently be used for calculating capital
charges for options under the standardised approach to market risk (scenario matrix
approach). This alternative, though definitely worth considering, is not being dis-
cussed at present and will therefore be only briefly explored in this article. Scenario
approaches may be regarded as a kind of “halfway house” between risk-sensitive
standardised approaches and internal models. If they are prescribed as a regulatory
standardised approach, they may also demonstrate the weaknesses of standardised
approaches described above. The key criteria for evaluating such approaches are the
scenario generation technique and the process/algorithm used for calculating val-
uation adjustments on the basis of the scenarios. An especially critical question is
to what extent the (tail) loss risk of the instruments and portfolios concerned can
be captured. At one end of the spectrum are approaches that merely differentiate
between a few scenarios (e.g. base case and adverse case) and make no attempt to
estimated a loss distribution. At the other extreme are internal models which simulate
such a large number of scenarios that it is possible to estimate a loss distribution on
the basis of which a parameter such as VaR or expected shortfall can be calculated.
Another important question is whether or not the scenario generation takes account
of stressed environmental conditions.
To sum up, standardised approaches usually have considerable failings when
it comes to measuring risk, especially the risk associated with large-scale, com-
plex trading activities. On their own, they are not an adequate basis on which to
determine appropriate capital requirements.32 So it may be concluded at this point
31 One example: when supervisors set risk factors in the standardised approach model, basis risk is
often ignored because different risk factors are (and must be) mapped to the same regulatory risk
factor. This is part of the model simplification process. It is often easy to design a trade to exploit
the “difference”.
32 The outlined shortcomings of standardised approaches also mean they have only limited suitability
as a floor for model-based capital requirements. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, model risk
would therefore not be reduced by a floor.
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that, together or separately, a leverage ratio and standardised approaches are inappro-
priate and insufficient from a supervisory perspective. Internal models must remain
the first choice. Nevertheless, confidence in internal models needs to be significantly
strengthened.
4 Ways of Restoring Confidence
4.1 Overview
The first, important step should be to standardise supervisory approval processes to
eliminate this major source of variation. A single set of approval and review standards
should be developed for application worldwide. A globally consistent procedure
needs to be enforced for granting and withdrawing permission to use models. With
activities of this kind, supervisors themselves could make a significant contribution
to restoring confidence.33
A number of further proposals are also under discussion at present. Together, they
have the potential to go a long way towards winning back trust:
a. Reducing the variation in model results through standardisation (Sect. 4.2).
b. Enhancing transparency (Sect. 4.3).
c. Highlighting the positive developments as a result of the trading book review
(Sect. 4.4).
d. Strengthening the use test concept (Sect. 4.5).
e. A comprehensive approach to model validation (Sect. 4.6).
f. Quantification and capitalisation of model risk (Sect. 4.7).
g. Voluntary commitment by banks to a code of “model ethics” (Sect. 4.8).
h. Other approaches (Sect. 4.9).
4.2 Reducing the Variation in Model Results Through
Standardisation
First of all, however, it is important to be aware of the dangers of excessive standard-
isation34:
33 For example: the range of multipliers (“3 + x” multiplier), which convert model results into
capital requirements, and the reasons for their application differ widely from one jurisdiction to
another.
34 The Basel Committee is already trying to find a balance between the objectives of “risk sensitiv-
ity”, “complexity” and “comparability”. Standardisation has the potential to reduce the complexity
of internal models and increase their comparability. Against that, increasing the complexity of
standardised approaches often improves comparability. See [5, 22] on the balancing debate.
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• Standardised models can pose a threat to financial stability because they encourage
all banks to react in the same way (herd behaviour). Model diversity is a desirable
phenomenon from a prudential point of view since it generates less procyclicality.
• Standardised models would frequently be unsuitable for internal use at larger
banks, which would consequently need to develop alternative models for internal
risk management purposes. As a result, the regulatory model would be maintained
purely for prudential purposes (in violation of the use test; see below). This would
encourage strategies aimed at reducing capital requirements since the results of
this model would not have to, and could not, be used internally.
• It is therefore in the nature of models that a certain amount of variation will
inevitably exist.
Nonetheless, it is most certainly possible to standardise models in a way which will
reduce their complexity and improve the comparability of their results but will not
compromise their suitability for internal use. Here are a few suggestions35:
• Develop a market standard for IRC models to avoid variation as a result of differ-
ences in the choice of model (proposed standard established by supervisors: see
Trading Book Review).
• Reduce the amount of flexibility in how historical data are used. For the standard
VaR, one year should be not just the minimum but both the minimum and max-
imum period. This may well affect different banks in different ways, sometimes
increasing capital requirements and sometimes reducing them.
• Standardise the stress period for stressed VaR. The period should be set by super-
visors instead of being selected by banks. True, this means the stress period would
no longer be optimally suited to the individual portfolio in question. But as the
study by the Basel Committee’s SIB-TB has shown, similar periods may, as a
result of the financial crisis, be considered relevant at the highest portfolio level—
namely the second half of 2008 (including Lehman insolvency) and the first half
of 2009.36
4.3 Enhancing Transparency
Much could also be done to improve transparency. Banks could disclose their
modelling methodologies in greater detail, and explain—for example—why changes
made to their models have resulted in reduced capital charges. Transparency of this
kind will significantly benefit informed experts and analysts. These experts will then
be faced with the difficult challenge of preparing their analyses in such a way as to
be accessible to the general public. The public at large cannot be expected to be the
primary addressees of a bank’s disclosures. Someone without specialist knowledge is
unlikely to be able to understand a risk report, for instance. Nor is it the task of banks
35 Cf. [23].
36 Cf. [6], p. 50.
Regulatory Developments in Risk Management … 31
to write their reports in a manner that makes such specialist knowledge unnecessary.
This is, however, by no means an argument against improving transparency.
The work of the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force (EDTF) is also a welcome
contribution37 and some banks have already implemented its recommendations in
their trading units voluntarily. The slide from the Deutsche Bank’s presentation for
analysts on 31 January 2013 is just one illustration.38 This explains, in particular, the
changes in market-risk-related RWAs (mRWA flow), i.e. it is made clear what brought
about the reduction in capital requirements in the trading area. The reasons include
reduced multipliers (for converting model results into capital requirements) on the
back of significantly better review results, approval of models (IRB approach, IMM)
for some additional products and the consideration of additional netting agreements
and collateral in calculations of capital requirements.
Another possible means of improving transparency would be to disclose the his-
tory of individual positions with a certain time lag. Serious discussion is nevertheless
called for to determine at what point the additional cost of transparency incurred by
banks would exceed the additional benefit for stakeholders. From an economic per-
spective, this may be regarded as a transparency ceiling.
4.4 Highlighting the Positive Developments as a Result
of the Trading Book Review
The Basel Committee is currently working on a fundamental review of how capital
requirements should be calculated for trading book exposures.39 It has taken criticism
of the existing regime on board and proposes to reduce the leeway granted to banks
in the design of their internal models. Without going into the Committee’s extensive
analysis in detail, here are some key elements of relevance to the questions examined
in this article:
• Expected shortfall is to be introduced as a new risk metric calibrated to a period
of market stress. The intention is to switch to a coherent measure of risk which
can take better account of tail risk.40 The reference to a stress period is intended
to address the issue of “fair-weather models” (the problem facing the turkey in
Taleb’s “The Black Swan”).
• A so-called desk approach is to be introduced for granting and withdrawing
approval for models. In the future, model approval is to be decided on a
case-by-case basis at trading desk level. This will enable portfolios which are
illiquid and/or cannot easily be modelled to be excluded from the model’s scope.
37 Cf. [13]. Recommendations for market risk (nos 22–25), cf. pp. 12, 51–55.
38 Cf. [12], p. 23.
39 Cf. [2, 3].
40 Cf. [1], p. 203.
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• Model validation will take place at desk level and become even more stringent
through backtesting and a new P&L attribution process. This will significantly
improve the validation process. At the same time, it will have the effect of raising
the barriers to obtaining supervisory approval of internal models.
• All banks using models will also have to calculate requirements using the stan-
dardised approach. Supervisors take the view that the standardised approach can
serve as a floor, or even a benchmark, for internal models (the level of the floor has
not yet been announced). This may provide a further safety mechanism to avoid
underestimating risk, even if the standardised approach does not always produce
sound results (see above).
4.5 Strengthening the Use Test Concept
Up to now, approval of internal models has been dependent, among other things,
on supervisors being convinced that the model is really used for internal risk man-
agement purposes. Banks consequently have to demonstrate that the model they
have submitted for supervisory approval is their main internal risk management tool.
Basically, they have to prove that the internal model used to manage risk is largely
identical to the model used to calculate capital charges (use test). The rationale behind
this sensible supervisory requirement is that the quality of these risk measurement
systems can best be ensured over time if the internal use of the model results is an
absolute prerequisite of supervisory approval. As a result of the use test, the bank’s
own interests are linked to the quality of the model. The design of the model should
on no account be driven purely by prudential requirements. Moreover, the reply to
the question of how model results are used for internal risk management purposes
shows what shape the bank’s “risk culture” is in.
The use test concept has been undermined, however, by a development towards
more prudentially driven models which began under Basel 2.5 and is even more
pronounced under Basel 3.5. This trend should be reversed. At a minimum, the core
of the model should be usable internally—that is to say be consistent with the bank’s
strategies for measuring risk. Conservative adjustments can then be made outside the
core.
4.6 A Comprehensive Approach to Model Validation
It should be borne in mind that conventional backtesting methods cannot be per-
formed on IRC models. Instead, the EBA has issued special guidelines based on
indirect methods such as stress tests, sensitivity and scenario analyses.41
A distinction therefore needs to be made between “normal” market risk models
41 Cf. [14], pp. 15 f.
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and IRC models. Though validation standards already exist for IRC models, they
can by no means be described as comprehensive.
For normal market risk models, a comprehensive approach going beyond purely
quantitative backtesting and the P&L attribution process could be supported by banks
themselves. Proposals to this effect are already on the table at the Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin).42 It would be worth examining whether the minimum
requirements for the IRB approach could make an additional contribution. These
minimum requirements already pursue a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative
approach to validation, though it may not be possible to apply a number of problems
needing to be resolved to the area of market risk.43
4.7 Quantification and Capitalisation of Model Risk
A further approach might be to quantify and capitalise model risk either in the form
of a capital surcharge on model results under pillar 1 or as an additional risk category
under pillar 2.
It would be worthwhile discussing the idea of using the diverging result inter-
val of the hypothetical portfolio exercise (see Sect. 2.2) as a quantitative basis for
individual capital surcharges. This may be regarded as prudential benchmarking.44
The portfolios tested in this exercise do not, however, correspond to banks’ real
individual portfolios, which makes them a questionable basis for individual capital
surcharges. As explained above in Sect. 2.2, moreover, it cannot be concluded that
the differences are largely due to model weaknesses. The question of how to derive
the differences actually due to model risk from the observed “gross” differences is
yet to be clarified and will probably be fraught with difficulties. What is more, model
risk is not reflected solely in the differences in model results (see below on the nature
of model risk, which also covers the inappropriate use of model results, for example,
which can result in flawed management decisions).
This raises the question as to whether it may be better to address model risk under
pillar 2. If model risk is assumed to arise, first, when statistical models are not used
properly and, second, from an inevitable uncertainty surrounding key features of
models, then it is likely to be encountered above all in the areas of
• design (model assumptions concerning the distribution of market risk parameters
or portfolio losses, for example),
• implementation (e.g. the approximation assumptions necessary for IT purposes),
• internal processes (e.g. complete and accurate coverage of positions, capture of
market data, valuation models at instrument level [see below]) and IT systems
used by banks to estimate risk, and
42 Cf. [9], pp. 38–49.
43 Cf. Articles 174, 185 CRR [29].
44 The EBA is currently preparing a regulatory technical standard to this effect under Article 78 of
CRD IV.
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• model use.45
The authors take the view that solving the question of how to quantify model risk for
the purpose of calculating capital charges is a process very much in its infancy and
that it is consequently too soon for regulatory action in this field. As in other areas,
risk-sensitive capital requirements should be sought; one-size-fits-all approaches,
like that called for by the Liikanen Group, should not be pursued because they
usually end up setting perverse incentives.
This point notwithstanding, there are already rigid capital requirements for trad-
ing activities under pillar 1 which address model risk, namely in the area of prudent
valuation. These require valuation adjustments to be calculated on accounting mea-
surements of fair value instruments (additional valuation adjustments, AVAs) and
deducted from CET1 capital. This creates a capital buffer to cover model risk associ-
ated with valuation models at instrument level (see above).46 Valuation risk arising
from the existence of competing valuation models and from model calibration is
addressed by the EBA standard. Deductions for market price uncertainty (Article 8
of the EBA RTS) can also be interpreted as charges for model risk, even if the EBA
does not itself use the term.
4.8 Voluntary Commitment by Banks to a Code of “Model
Ethics”
A commitment could be made to refrain from aggressive or inappropriate modelling
with the sole aim of minimising capital requirements. Banks voluntarily exclude
portfolios, such as certain (though by no means all) securitisation portfolios, from the
scope of their model if questionable results tend to be generated. This may be regarded
as a subitem of the modelling validation issue. The desk approach under Basel 3.5
will help to put this new culture into practice. Since capital requirements will have
to be calculated using the standardised approach as well as the IMA, any aggressive
modelling should be exposed. At a minimum, banks will have to demonstrate that
the standardised approach overstates risk in the portfolio in question. If this cannot
be demonstrated, a case of excessively aggressive modelling may be assumed.
4.9 Other Approaches
Other approaches to restoring confidence also deserve a brief mention:
• further incentives to use models appropriately
• opening up of access to trade repository data
• review of models by auditors
45 Cf. [28], pp. 20–23.
46 Cf. [15], p. 20, Art. 11.
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• more stringent new product introduction (NPI) processes.
In addition to the code of “moral ethics” discussed in Sect. 4.8, the following addi-
tional incentive to use models appropriately could be considered. Establishing a link
between traders’ bonuses and model backtesting results could serve to improve the
alignment of interests. This idea is also closely connected with the issue of strength-
ening the use test concept (see Sect. 4.5).
Trade repositories already collect key data, including calculated market values,
relating to all derivative contracts, irrespective of whether they are centrally cleared
or not. As things stand, banks have no way of accessing the data of other banks. If
access were made possible at an anonymised level, for example, banks would be able
to carry out internal benchmarking, which could reduce valuation uncertainty and
thus model risk (see also Sect. 4.7).
External auditors already review banks’ internal models (both instrument and
stochastic) when auditing the annual accounts. Ways could be explored of further
improving or extending this process, e.g. to include a review of use test compliance.
In the insurance industry, the chief actuary is personally responsible for the correct
pricing of new products. This practice could be adopted in the NPI process used in
the banking industry. The CRO would then be responsible for pricing products fairly,
including products aimed at retail clients. The NPI process could also be made stricter
by requiring external reviewers to approve major new products. Finally, the suitability
of proxy approaches, which are extremely important in the NPI process, could be
examined more stringently and in greater depth.
5 Conclusion
The key conclusions of this article can be summarised as follows:
• A risk-sensitive and model-based approach to calculating capital requirements for
banks should be retained.
• Not only should model-based approaches be formally retained, but there should
also continue to be a capital incentive to use these approaches (i.e. no overriding
leverage ratio, no floor set at too high a level).
• Non-risk-sensitive approaches to calculating capital requirements should, at most,
be used in a complementary capacity, serving merely as indicators and not as
binding limits. Otherwise, dangerous perverse incentives will arise.
• There are also dangers associated with risk-sensitive standardised approaches
because these typically overestimate or underestimate the actual risk.
• Variation in the area of models is something that needs to be lived with to a certain
extent. Some standardisation is nevertheless possible, as are other ways of restoring
confidence. But it should not compromise the internal usability of models.
36 U. Gaumert and M. Kemmer
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
1. Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J.M., Heath, D.: Coherent measures of risk. Math. Financ. 9(3),
203–228 (1999)
2. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Consultative document—Fundamental review of
the trading book (2012)
3. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Consultative document—Fundamental review of
the trading book: A revised market risk framework (2013)
4. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Consultative document—Revised Basel III leverage
ratio framework and disclosure requirements (2013)
5. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Discussion paper—The regulatory framework: bal-
ancing risk sensitivity, simplicity and comparability (2013)
6. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Regulatory consistency assessment programme
(RCAP)—Analysis of risk-weighted assets for market risk (2013)
7. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Regulatory consistency assessment programme
(RCAP)—Second report on risk-weighted assets for market risk in the trading book (2013)
8. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure
requirements (2014)
9. Bongers, O.: Mindestanforderungen an die Validierung von Risikomodellen. In: Martin, R.W.,
Quell, P., Wehn, C.: Modellrisiko und Validierung von Risikomodellen, pp. 33–64. Cologne
(2013)
10. Bundesverband deutscher Banken (Association of German Banks): Discussion paper:
Finanzmarktturbulenzen—Gibt es Weiterentwicklungsmöglichkeiten von einzelnen Methoden
im Risikomanagement? (2008)
11. Deutsche Bank AG: 2007 to 2013 Annual Reports
12. Deutsche Bank AG: Investor Relations, presentation for Deutsche Bank analysts’ conference
call on 31 January 2013, https://www.deutsche-bank.de/ir/de/images/Jain_Krause_4Q2012_
Analyst_call_31_Jan_2013_final.pdf
13. Enhanced Disclosure Task Force: Enhancing the Risk Disclosures of Banks—Report of the
Enhanced Disclosure Task Force (2013)
14. European Banking Authority (EBA): EBA Guidelines on the Incremental Default and Migration
Risk Charge (IRC), EBA/GL/2012/3 (2012)
15. European Banking Authority (EBA): EBA FINAL draft Regulatory Technical Standards on
prudent valuation under Article 105(14) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Require-
ments Regulation—CRR) (2014)
16. Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht—
BaFin): 2007 Annual Report (2008)
17. Frenkel, M., Rudolf, M.: Die Auswirkungen der Einführung einer Leverage Ratio als zusät-
zliche aufsichtsrechtliche Beschränkung der Geschäftstätigkeit von Banken, expert opinion for
the Association of German Banks (2010)
18. Gaumert, U.: Finanzmarktkrise—Höhere Kapitalanforderungen im Handelsbuch interna-
tionaler Großbanken? In: Nagel, R., Serfling, K. (eds.) Banken, Performance und Finanzmärkte,
festschrift for Karl Scheidl’s 80th birthday, pp. 117–150 (2009)
19. Gaumert, U.: Plädoyer für eine modellbasierte Kapitalunterlegung. In: Die Bank, 5/2013, pp.
35–39 (2013)
20. Gaumert, U., Götz, S., Ortgies, J.: Basel III—eine kritische Würdigung. In: Die Bank, 5/2011,
pp. 54–60 (2011)
Regulatory Developments in Risk Management … 37
21. Gaumert, U., Schulte-Mattler, H.: Höhere Kapitalanforderungen im Handelsbuch. In: Die Bank,
12/2009, pp. 58–64 (2009)
22. German Banking Industry Committee: Comments on the BCBS Discussion Paper “The regu-
latory framework: balancing risk sensitivity, simplicity and comparability” (2013)
23. German Banking Industry Committee: Position paper “Standardisierungsmöglichkeiten bei
internen Marktrisikomodellen” (2013)
24. Haldane, A., Madouros, V.: The Dog and the Frisbee. Bank Of England, London (2012)
25. Hartmann-Wendels, T.: Umsetzung von Basel III in europäisches Recht. In: Die Bank, 7/2012,
pp. 38–44 (2012)
26. Hellwig, M., Admati, A.: The Bankers’ New Clothes. Princeton University Press, Princeton
(2013)
27. Kreditwesengesetz: Gesetz über das Kreditwesen—KWG, non-official reading version of
Deutschen Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main, as at 2 January (2014)
28. Quell, P.: Grundsätzliche Aspekte des Modellrisikos. In: Martin, R.W., Quell, P., Wehn, C.:
Modellrisiko und Validierung von Risikomodellen, pp. 15–32. Cologne (2013)
29. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation
(EU) No 648/2012 (CRR—Capital Requirements Regulation)
30. Senior Supervisors Group: Observations on Risk Management Practices during Recent Market
Turbulence (2008)
31. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMWi (Academic advisory board at the Federal Ministry for
Economic Affairs and Energy): Reform von Bankenregulierung und Bankenaufsicht nach der
Finanzkrise, Berlin, report 03/2010 (2010)
32. Zimmermann, G., Weber, M.: Die Leverage Ratio—Beginn eines Paradigmenwechsels in der
Bankenregulierung? In: Risiko Manager 25/26, pp. 26–28 (2012)
